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Smile for the Camera: The Revenge
Pornography Dilemma, California' s
Approach, and Its Constitutionality
by SNEHAL DESAI*
Introduction
Imagine this fictional, yet realistic scenario: Jane is a respectable
college senior, who had been in a long-term relationship with her
college boyfriend, John, for three and a half years. During the course
of their relationship, Jane had sent John "sexy" pictures of herself,
which included sexually explicit content. Jane trusted John and
expected the pictures to remain private-only for John's viewing
pleasure. Though Jane had never specifically told John not to display
or distribute the pictures to others, it never crossed her mind that it
was necessary to discuss nondisclosure with John. Three and a half
years after being together, the couple had a bitter breakup and Jane
found her pictures available on a "revenge pornography"' website.
The photos were disseminated around Jane's college campus, were
searchable online, and in turn, destroyed Jane's reputation. As a
result of the dissemination, Jane became depressed, has difficulty
trusting others, and has had trouble securing a job after her college
graduation. Jane has urged the webmaster of the cyber-revenge
website and John to take down the content, but both have refused.
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
2011, University of California, San Diego. I am very grateful to Professor Osagie
Obasogie for his guidance through the writing process. I am also thankful for the editorial
support of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly staff and for the support of my
loving family and friends. I dedicate this Note to my parents for their unconditional love
and encouragement hroughout my life.
1. Revenge pornography websites are websites "launched as a place for 'public
humiliation.' On sites such as IsAnyOneUp.com, users could upload sexually explicit
photos and videos without a victim's permission." FBI Investigates 'Revenge Porn'
Website Founder, May 22, 2012, (Nov. 23, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/fbi-investigates-revenge-porn-website-founder/story?id=16405425.
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This increasingly common scenario that destroyed Jane's
reputation has been coined "revenge pornography," a type of cyber-
harassment prevalent in today's internet age. Due to the First
Amendment's protection of speech and expression, victims have had
little legal recourse against cyber-harassers for revenge pornography.
The recent passage of statutes prohibiting revenge pornography has
led to the current debate about whether revenge pornography
statutes are constitutionally valid. Though lacking definitive
precedent regarding their constitutionality, revenge pornography falls
into the First Amendment exceptions for low value speech. Low
value speech remains outside the realm of First Amendment
protections due to its negative effects and because any possible
benefit that may arise from it "is clearly outweighed by the societal
interest in order and morality."2 Moreover, the government has a
compelling interest to prohibit revenge pornography because of its
interest to protect women, who are disproportionately impacted by
revenge pornography. This Note first aims to discuss the current
problem of revenge pornography as a form of cyber-harassment.
Second, this Note discusses the constitutional background of
traditional free speech doctrines and their application to the revenge
pornography context. Courts may be able to distinguish revenge
pornography as an unprotected form of speech under the fighting
words doctrine and true threats doctrine, although the perfect
application of either doctrine is rather unlikely. Accordingly, courts
should carve out a new category of unprotected speech for revenge
pornography, using the analysis in New York v. Ferber' as a model.
Lastly, this Note analyzes California's approach to revenge
pornography and provides some suggestions for improvement.
Although California remains one of only two states to implement a
revenge pornography law, the law should be revised to protect more
victims and punish more wrongdoers.
2. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
3. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1942).
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I. Cyber-Harassment Distinguished From Other Forms of
Cyber-Victimization
Legal commentators have written about "cyber-victimization," or
"online abuse[,] predominantly in terms of cyber-stalking, cyber-
harassment, and cyber-bullying."' Though definitions for these
concepts are still vague and overlap greatly, "these terms are derived
from their offline counterparts-[stalking, harassment, and
bullying]."5 Cyber-stalking, or the equivalent of physical stalking in
the offline world, involves "the use of the Internet, e-mail, or other
means of electronic communication to stalk or harass another
individual."6  Cyber-bullying involves the harassment of minors on
the internet.' Some commentators have used the term "cyber-
harassment" to describe online speech targeted at a person or group
of people based on their "membership in a protected class such as
race or gender." This Note focuses on revenge cyber-harassment,
which includes revenge pornography as a form of cyber-harassment.
Since courts treat minors and adults differently with regards to cyber-
harassment, this Note only examines the jurisprudence involving
adults.
A. Revenge Pornography
Revenge pornography, or cyber-revenge, "involves the posting of
nude or sexually explicit photos without the consent of the person
depicted."8 In the fictional scenario of Jane and John, John's posting
of Jane's "sexy" pictures constitutes revenge pornography because
Jane's pictures were posted without her consent and for the purpose
of defaming Jane. Visible in Jane's situation, "[i]n today's networked
society, abusive online conduct such as cyber-bullying and cyber-
harassment can cause serious damage, including severe emotional
distress, loss of employment, and even violence or death."9 In fact,
"[Ninety-three] percent [of revenge pornography victims] said they
4. Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1103, 1107 (2011).
5. Id. at 1108.
6. Id. at 1111.
7. Jacqueline Lipton, Cyber-Bullying and the First Amendment, 14 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 99, 105 (2012).
8. Cal. Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 255 (2013-2014
Reg. Sess.), as amended Aug. 21, 2013.
9. See Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 4, at 1104.
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have suffered significant emotional distress as a result of being a
victim."' Revenge pornography also disproportionately affects
women as shown by The Cyber Civil Rights Initiative's finding that
"[ninety] percent of revenge pornography victims are women.""
While many states have begun to formally recognize and penalize
cyber-harassment,2 few states actually distinguish and penalize
revenge pornography.
California and New Jersey were originally the only two states to
enact revenge pornography laws, but other states are finally starting
to pass similar legislation. States are hesitant to curb free speech
rights, which is why revenge pornography laws received significant
initial pushback under constitutional concerns.14  Moreover,
regulating revenge pornography is a challenge under the First
Amendment's freedom of expression and speech protections. "While
some laws in the United States do effectively regulate speech-
notably defamation law, copyright law, and trademark law-it has
proved to be very difficult to regulate private speech between
individuals."5  Furthermore, even though the content may be
harmful, it is not prohibited under the traditional protections of
defamation or copyright law.
There are three types of revenge pornography, but existing
revenge pornography laws in California do not protect the victims of
all three types. First, while revenge pornography broadly entails the
posting of one's picture without consent, the pictures may be
originally photographed by the victim. Second, the pictures may
alternatively be photographed by the wrongdoer. Under copyright
law, the victim may not prevail in an action if they are not the
10. Revenge Porn by the Numbers, END REVENGE PORN (Nov. 23, 2014, 3:38 PM),
www.end revengeporn.org/revenge-porn-infographic/.
11. Id.
12. Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-Mails: Can a
Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 18 (2010).
13. Liz Halloran, Race To Stop 'Revenge Porn' Raises Free Speech Worries, NPR
(Mar. 6, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2014/03/06/286388840/
race-to-stop-revenge-porn-raises-free-speech-worries; State 'Revenge Porn' Legislation,
(Nov. 23, 2014, 7:03 PM), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/state-revenge-pom-legislation.aspx.
14. Electronic Communication Devices: Prohibited Distribution of Personal
Information: Hearing on S.B. 255 Before the S. Pub. Safety Comm., S. Appropriations
Comm., & S. Floor, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013) (statement of the ACLU).
15. See Lipton, Cyber-Bullying and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 103.
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"creator" of the picture.6 Under defamation law, the wrongdoer may
skirt away from liability by arguing that posting the victim's picture
does not involve lies about the victim. Moreover, a wrongdoer may
prevail under the argument that the victim has to take responsibility
for any outcome arising from the nude photographs. Revenge
pornography may also fail under existing anti-harassment laws due to
the challenges implicated by the lack of imminent harm and the lack
of physical boundaries in cyberspace. For example, "unlike privacy
law... cyber- [harassment] involves no physical trespass on an
individual's solitude.,17  Additionally, "[flederal and state laws
prohibiting harassment and stalking only apply if the victim can show
that the non-consensual pornography is part of a larger pattern of
conduct directed at the victim with intent to distress or harm, which
will not apply to the many purveyors of non-consensual pornography
motivated by a desire for money or notoriety."18
When pictures of the victim are posted online, a victim suffers an
immediate physical danger contingent upon the viewing of the
content.19 For example, in situations of "puppeting," the third form of
revenge pornography, "a wrongdoer poses as the victim online."2 °
People have been known to pose as their victims online by posting
personal advertisements on services such as Craigslist, suggesting that
the victim harbors rape fantasies and giving the victim's personal
address and other contact details. As a result of the advertisements,
some women have been physically attacked at their places of
residence by third parties thinking they were answering the
advertisements and fulfilling the victim's rape fantasies. While there
is obviously a threat of physical harm here, if the victim never sees the
advertisements, she will not be aware of the threat until it is too
late.,21 Thus, revenge pornography laws are necessary to prevent the
dissemination of photographs for which a victim would not
reasonably give consent. Though many defendants may attempt to
claim free speech defenses, the Constitution does not provide a
blanket security for all types of speech.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
17. Id.
18. Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, END REVENGE PORN (Nov. 23,
2014,3:42 PM), http://www.endrevengeporn.org/guide-to-legislation/.
19. See Lipton, Cyber-Bullying and the First Amendment, supra note 7, at 109.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 110.
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II. Constitutional Underpinnings
A. Historical Treatment of Unprotected Speech
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech."22 The First Amendment
was designed to protect "free trade in ideas"23 instead of unnecessarily
censoring people's views and thoughts. Moreover, the First
Amendment protects expressive conduct, as well as spoken and
written words, and "it covers political, social, artistic, literary, and
other forms of speech."24 However, speech is not per se protected
under the First Amendment for the sake of being speech. "In
practice, the Court has 'consistently held' that [speech] is subject to
interpretation, and that the freedom of speech may be restrained 'for
appropriate reasons."'25 Thus, courts consider some speech of such
low value that it remains outside the realm of protected speech due to
its negative effects and because any possible benefit that may arise
from it "is clearly outweighed by the societal interest in order and
morality."26 For example, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,27 "the
Court... first fully enunciated what Professor Harry Kalven later
termed the 'two level' theory of speech, under which speech is either
'protected' or 'unprotected' by the First Amendment according to the
Court's assessment of its relative value."" The Court described that
some categories of speech are inherently unprotected speech, the
prohibition of which has never created any constitutional questions.
Such "categories of unprotected speech [include] obscenity, libel, true
threats, fighting words and illegal advocacy."30
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. Thea E. Potanos, Dueling Values: The Clash of Cyber Suicide Speech and the First
Amendment, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 679 (2012).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572.
27. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. 568.
28. GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V.
TUSHNET, & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1086 (6th ed. 2009).
29. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 568.
30. Id. at 680.
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1. The Fighting Words Doctrine
The Court first broached the concept of fighting words in
Chaplinsky.3 Fighting words are "those by which their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."32
The statute in contention in Chaplinksy provided that "no person
shall address any other person who is lawfully in any street or other
public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name ... with
intent to deride, offend or annoy him... "" The Court agreed with
the lower court's decision to uphold the law on policy grounds.
"[T]he statute's purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words
being forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause an act
of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed.3 4 Wary about punishing all derisive and annoying words
with over-inclusive regulations, the Court emphasized that speech is
not considered fighting words based on one's subjective
interpretation.3" In allowing for subjective interpretations, the Court
worried that there would be a chilling effect on free speech rights,
resulting in First Amendment protections being toothless.36
Moreover, "the test [for fighting words] is what men of common
intelligence would understand [to] be words likely to cause an
average addressee to fight... Thus, only speech that would incite
an average individual to immediately fight or cause an immediate
breach of peace constitutes fighting words.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul," the Court provided further analysis
of the fighting words doctrine, ultimately invalidating the St. Paul,
Minnesota Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance.39  The Ordinance
prohibited the public display of a burning cross, a swastika, or any
other symbol that would be reasonably known to upset people on the
basis of their membership in a particular race, gender, or religion.4°
The Court elucidated the idea that the government generally may not
31. Id. at 572.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 569.




38. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 380.
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proscribe speech based on the unfavorable nature of the ideas that
are expressed.41 However, the Court noted that it "ha[s] long held,
for example, that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned
because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it
expresses-so that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against
outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag of an
ordinance dishonoring the flag is not.4' The Court distinguished the
fighting words doctrine from the curtailment of the expression of
ideas, because the prohibition of fighting words is a proscription of
the mode of expression, rather than the expression itself.43 Moreover,
the Court reasoned that "the reason why the fighting words are
categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is
not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that their
content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary)
mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.""
This idea stems from the Chaplinsky court's idea that "our society
[has] permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas, which are of slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.
45
St. Paul argued that its ordinance was constitutional because its
purpose was to "protect against the victimization of a person or
persons who are particularly vulnerable because of their membership
in a group that historically has been discriminated against."
6
Moreover, St. Paul urged the Court to look to the secondary effects of
the cross burning and offensive conduct.47 The secondary effects deal
specifically with the marginalization of African Americans, which has
been historically prevalent in the United States.48 Additionally, St.
Paul argued that due to the historical meaning of cross burning, the
act of cross burning should be banned because of the secondary
effects of emotional distress arising from the activity.49 The Court
41. Id. at 382.
42. Id. at 385.
43. Id. at 433.
44. Id. at 393.
45. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 568.
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rejected this argument concluding that "[t]he emotive impact of
speech on its audience is not a 'secondary effect,' 50 and that
"[1]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary
effects"' the Court intended to prevent.1 The Court found that "St.
Paul ha[d] not singled out an especially offensive mode of
expression-it ha[d] not, for example, selected for prohibition only
those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as
opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner.,52 Instead, St. Paul had a
blanket ban on fighting words of "whatever manner that
communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance."53
2. True Threats
In Virginia v. Black,54 the Court distinguished true threats from
activities that have historically been known to threaten a person or
group of people.5 Moreover, in Virginia, the Court invalidated a ban
on cross burning that was seen as a prima facie showing of
intimidation.6 The Court explained: "'true threats' encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals."57 Though cross burning
has a particularly dangerous history in the United States and has
generally been associated with hateful messages, the Court advocated
that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
50. The secondary effects theory-also known as a time, place, and manner
regulation-allows regulation of speech, not based on the content of the speech, but based
on the secondary effects of the speech. See Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986).
51. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
52. Id. at 393.
53. Id. at 393-94.
54. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (1993).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 359.
Winter 20151
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."
The Ninth Circuit further interpreted the true threats doctrine in
United States v. Cassel,59 a case involving the defendant threatening
two prospective government land buyers in order to dissuade the
interested buyers from purchasing the land next to his. 6 The court
held that "speech is punishable if a reasonable person would
understand it as a threat, whether or not the speaker meant for it to
be understood."61 Thus, the defendant need not intend to cause harm
through the threatening speech. If the speech can be reasonably
interpreted as a threat, it is enough to fall under the "true threat"
category. The Cassel court also furthered the idea that the threat is
"[not] necessarily limited to threats of bodily harm."2 [Threat of]
'[i]ntimidation,' both in common and legal usage, can refer to the act
of placing someone in fear of injury other than harm to the body."63
3. Defamation and Libel
Defamation and libel are additional categories of unprotected
speech deliniated by the Chaplinsky court.6' The landmark
defamation is New York Times v. Sullivan,65 which established that
actual malice must be present for speech to be defamatory and
libelous toward public officials.66 However, it was in Gertz v. Robert
Welch67 that the Court acknowledged that a different and less strict
standard applies for defamation claims against private individuals.6
The Court recognized that "the legitimate state interest underlying
the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm
inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.,69 Moreover, the Court
58. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
59. United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2006).
60. Id. at 625.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 636.
63. Id. at 636.
64. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572.
65. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
66. Id.
67. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 341.
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explained that a lesser standard is afforded to private individuals
because they are "less vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in
protecting them is correspondingly greater."' The Court reasoned
that private individuals have fewer opportunities for recourse against
defamation than do public officials and officers do, because "public
persons [have] more access to the media to defend themselves."7'
Additionally, the Court noted that public officials and officers not
only have more channels to redress defamatory claims against them,
but defamatory claims are foreseeable consequences of one's
"involvement in public affairs."" Thus, in an effort to allow states to
protect individuals from defamation, the Court has allowed states to
enact their own laws to deal with the punishment and condemnation
of defamation against private individuals.73 Moreover, the Court has
dismissed requiring proof of "actual injury," and has explained that
the publication of defamatory material per se includes harms such as
the "impairment of reputation, and standing in the community,
personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."7
B. Modern Day Application of Traditional Free Speech Doctrines
1. Standard of Review Distinguished Between Content-Neutral and
Content-Based Speech Restrictions
Courts generally tend to allow the curtailment of speech in the
most extreme and necessary circumstances.75 The Court accordingly
treats content-based and content-neutral speech differently.76
Content-based restrictions are more dangerous to the free flow of
ideas and freedom of speech, which is why content-based restrictions
must pass the muster of strict scrutiny before being deemed
constitutionally valid. Content-neutral speech restrictions, however,
must only survive intermediate scrutiny.7  Courts have further
provided, that "[i]n determining whether a statute is content-neutral,
one must determine whether 'the government has adopted a
70. Id. at 344.
71. Id. at 388.
72. Id. at 344.
73. Id. at 350.
74. Id.
75. See Potanos, supra note 23, at 697.
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regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys."7 9
For example, in United States v. Cassidy, the defendant was
indicted for "violat[ing] a federal stalking statute, when, with the
intent to harass and cause substantial emotional distress," he used
Twitter to cause emotional distress to A.Z. 8° The District Court
found that the part of the anti-stalking statute that was used in the
accusation was a content-based restriction "because it limits speech
on the basis of whether that speech is emotionally distressing to
A.Z." The court contended that "[t]o survive strict scrutiny, the
Government has the burden of showing that a content-based
restriction 'is necessary to serve a compelling state interest."'8'2 Based
on prior precedent in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
the court found that the statute in Cassidy was unconstitutional
because, as in Playboy Entertainment Group, the state's interest was
to "shield the sensibilities of listeners."3 Moreover, the government
cannot restrict speech because of its interest in protecting listeners
and viewers from offensive content." The court further held that
expression prevails in such cases, and "[wie are expected to protect
our own sensibilities simply by averting [our] eyes.85  Thus, the
Cassidy court dismissed the indictment because "A.Z. had the ability
to protect her 'own sensibilities simply by averting' her eyes from the
Defendant's blog and not looking at, or blocking his Tweets.
86
In the case of cyber-harassment and, namely, revenge
pornography, the circumstances may be similar, in which a harasser
posts offensive photos on a Twitter page or a personal blog. Though
the argument can be made that the victim should avoid visiting the
Twitter and blog pages, the harm is much greater than a simple
nuisance or abiding by the popular childhood adage, "sticks and
stones may break your bones, but words can never hurt you."
Although "Twitter and blogs are today's equivalent of bulletin board
79. Id. at 583 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
80. Id. at 576.
81. Id. at 584.
82. Id. (citations omitted).






that one is free to disregard,"' when a Twitter page or blog contains
the posting of nude pictures without consent, the prevention of
negative publicity and reputation that is created by these photos is a
compelling governmental interest that is distinguished from the
government's interest in the Cassidy case.
The District Court acknowledged that Tweeting about a person
is a different mode of harassment in comparison to harassing
someone via telephone, since "harassing telephone calls 'are targeted
towards a particular victim and are received outside a public
forum."' However, although the Cassidy court correctly points out
that "Twitter and blogs are today's equivalent of a bulletin board that
one is free to disregard,"89 the court incorrectly weighs the harms
emanating from such online forums. Though one can easily disregard
online postings, disregarding the abuse does not necessarily mean that
the harms are not present. Unlike bulletin boards being physically
fixed in one location, online pages are ever-present and can be viewed
and disseminated by millions of internet users. Even if the nude
pictures are eventually taken down, there is no way to prevent
viewers from saving the images immediately upon viewing them. The
same cannot be done with a bulletin board. Though the repercussions
of having abusive content posted on physical bulletin boards are
similarly embarrassing, they are not as severe as the repercussions of
revenge pornography.
In one particular case further examined below, People v. Rosa,9°
revenge pornography victim Jennifer Vander Tuig was unaware that
her ex-husband had posted her nude photographs on a website.9' In
fact, Vander Tuig did not even view her nude photos before she
began to suffer from the postings.92 She suffered embarrassment,
fear, emotional distress, and faced harassment by viewers.93 Thus, just
because one may and should be able to avoid harmful content does
not mean that the harmful effects are obliterated. The government
has a compelling interest in protecting people from harmful and
87. Id.
88. Id. at 585.
89. Id.
90. People v. Rosa, No. F063748, 2013 WL 941728 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2013),
review denied (June 19, 2013).
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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threatening content that causes them emotional distress, especially
when the content is disseminated online.
2. Revenge Pornography as "Fighting Words" or "True Threats"
The situations in which the aforementioned unprotected speech
doctrines have been applied were traditionally in the context of
spoken speech and print speech via mass publication, such as
newspapers.94 Though an argument can be made that certain types of
speech, such as revenge pornography, constitute the type of low value
speech that is traditionally unprotected as contended by the court in
Chaplinsky, the application of these doctrines are not perfect fits in
the revenge pornography context. For example, revenge
pornography constitutes "fighting words," because as in Chaplinsky,
revenge pornography inflicts injury in the form of emotional distress,
harmed reputation, and in some cases, a threat to one's physical well-
being. In the case of Jane and John, due to the easily retrievable
nude photographs of Jane on the internet, Jane became depressed
and also faced damage to her personal and professional reputations.
Regardless of the increasing harms of revenge pornography, the
modern-day application of the fighting words doctrine rarely goes
beyond its original interpretation, which makes its application to
revenge pornography challenging. Though the Chaplinsky decision
has never been overturned, the Court has been wary about the
overexpansion of the fighting words doctrine.9 The Supreme Court
has retreated away from using the fighting words doctrine; however,
state courts still apply the "immediate breach of peace" prong of the
fighting words doctrine.96
Since the fighting words doctrine has generally been limited to
face-to-face confrontations, its application to the cyber context would
be very difficult, unless courts take into account the changing form of
interactions in the digital era. One of the main elements in
Chaplinsky was a face-to-face confrontation leading to an immediate
breach of peace caused specifically by the fighting words.97 However,
the Chaplinsky case was decided in 1942 and most interactions today
no longer occur face-to-face. Online conduct becomes difficult to
square away under the fighting words doctrine because of the lack of
94. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
95. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 4, at 1107.
96. State v. Drahota, 280 Neb. 627 (2010).
97. Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. 568.
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in-person interactions and uncertainty regarding whether or not
online insults lead to an immediate breach of peace. Commenting on
the application of the fighting words doctrine to cyber-bullying,
District Court Judge Terrence F. McVerry explained that "[an]
Internet page is not outside of the protections of the First
Amendment under the fighting words doctrine because there is
simply no in-person confrontation in cyber-space such that physical
violence is likely to be instigated."98
An additional challenge to the application of the fighting words
doctrine is determining when the "immediate" breach of peace
occurs; since some cyber-harassment in the form of revenge
pornography may occur over the course of hours, days, or even
weeks, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint exactly when the breach of
peace occurs. Moreover, courts are likely to find it difficult to make
an exact temporal connection between revenge pornography and an
immediate breach of peace. However, courts must recognize that
much cyber-harassment directly leads to harmful effects, such as
suicide. Revenge pornography has the potential to immediately
breach peace since suicides could occur immediately after the
postings. Additionally, "[v]ictims are routinely threatened with
sexual assault, stalked, [and] harassed," which can occur as
immediately as the posting of the picture9 With the possibility of
constant online harassment, it is harder to pinpoint the exact point in
which a direct breach of peace has occurred, unlike with an in-person
encounter. Thus, by focusing on the temporal element of breaches of
peace in the cyberspace context, courts will find it difficult to apply
the fighting words doctrine to the revenge pornography context.
The application of the true threats doctrine is more persuasive in
deeming revenge pornography as constitutionally proscribable.
Applying the true threats doctrine, the Ninth Circuit explained that
"'a threat is 'an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or
damage on another.""'  In Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists,°'
defendants were anti-abortion activists that created "GUILTY"
98. See Calvert, supra note 12, at 39.
99. Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing "Revenge Porn": Frequently Asked Questions,
(Nov. 23, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2337998.
100. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
101. Id.
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posters with the names, addresses, and pictures of doctors who
performed abortions.12 Though the defendants claimed that they had
a free speech right to disseminate the posters, the court found the
posters to be true threats based on the true threats test.'°3 Similar to
the revenge pornography context, the court considered "[w]hether
[the] posters can be considered "true threats" when in fact the posters
on their face contain no explicitly threatening language."' 14 The
incidence of revenge pornography sparks a similar question about
whether the dissemination of one's nude photographs can be
considered 'true threats.' Based on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Planned Parenthood, revenge pornography would constitute true
threats.
As analyzed in the next section, revenge pornography is often
disseminated through the form of personal advertisements, where the
perpetrator misleads advertisement viewers into thinking that the
victim is soliciting herself for sex.' As a result, women are actually in
physical danger of sexual violence and harassment. Even without the
personal advertisements, women may reasonably fear harassment and
stalking by those who have viewed their nude photographs online. It
is also justified for victims to feel a sense of paranoia.
The Cassel court recognized that no actual intent to threaten is
required.'6 The court even went as far to say that this "standard does
not violate the First Amendment."'0 7 This holding is applicable in the
revenge pornography context because the victim may not have direct
proof of the perpetrator's intent to intimidate. However, it is
reasonable for a woman to be fearful after finding out that her nude
pictures are attracting the attention of internet predators.
Unlike cross burning in Virginia, the invasion of a woman's right
of privacy regarding her own body is a true threat and should be
constitutionally protected. It is low value speech and no woman
should be susceptible to gender violence resulting from the
nonconsensual posting of her nude pictures. Deeming revenge
pornography as unconstitutional is also the least restrictive means of
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1070.
105. People v. Rosa, No. F063748, 2013 WL 941728 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2013),
review denied (June 19, 2013).
106. Cassel, 408 F.3d at 629.
107. Id.
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protecting the rights of revenge pornography victims, and it does not
infringe upon one's right to view nudity online. One has the liberty to
access other pornographic content through pornography websites and
via adult content stores.
C. Carving-Out a Previously Unidentified Category of Unprotected
Speech
Many of the traditional exceptions to the freedom of speech
doctrine involve outdated examples, making it difficult for courts to
pigeonhole new forms of "speech" into the already existing
categories. Accordingly, the Court needs to revisit the meaning of
"speech" in the 21st Century in order to recognize cyber-harassment,
including revenge pornography, as a previously unidentified category
of unprotected speech, as was done in Ferber.'" Previous Supreme
Court decisions demonstrate that the recognition of a new category of
unprotected speech is infrequent and is based on a stringent
analysis."° The Court does not preclude the idea of new categories
being recognized; however, it stated that the "Constitution forecloses
any attempt to revise [the First Amendment's protections] simply on
the basis that some speech is not worth it.""' Free speech rights often
prevail over one's dislike of a particular type of speech because the
First Amendment prevents the censorship of speech based on the
subjective disapproval of a particular idea.' Moreover, the
Constitution also requires more than just a cost-benefit analysis when
deciding to inhibit speech."' Thus, although there are strong policy
arguments in favor of restricting certain forms of speech, the Court
will not blindly adhere to policy arguments without ascertaining that
the statutes are carefully crafted to prevent unnecessary restrictions
of lawful speech."'
The government's regulation of speech is constitutional only if
the regulation fosters a compelling interest and if the regulation is
narrowly tailored"4 In Ferber, the Court carved out a new area of
unprotected speech when upholding a New York statute that
108. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.
109. See Potanos, supra note 23, at 697.
110. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 471.
113. Id. at 470.
114. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747.
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prohibited the creation and distribution of child pornography."5 The
Court "noted that the state of New York had a compelling interest in
protecting children from abuse, and that the value of using children in
these works (as opposed to simulated conduct or adult actions) was
de minimus....6 A cost-benefit analysis was involved in the process of
labeling child pornography as unprotected speech; however, the
statute still needed to further the compelling interest in the least
restrictive means.117 The Ferber Court recognized that the protection
of children holds a special place in United States jurisprudence.8
Moreover, the Court held that "a state's interest in 'safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling[,]""' 9
and that "the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the
child."'2 ° However, beyond the government's compelling interest, the
Court also found that prohibiting the creation and dissemination of
child pornography combats the actual abuse against children and is
the least restrictive means for doing so.' Legislators found that "the
distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by
juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children."'2
Thus, the statute was designed to curb actual harms against children,
unlike the statute in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,'23 which
unlawfully restricted simulated child pornography and adult actions.14
In Ferber, the Court also found that the law in contention was
the least restrictive and "only practical" means to "dry up the
market" for child pornography because it would directly prevent child
abuse that occurred in the making of child pornography.5 Although
115. Id.
116. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
117. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747.
118. Id. at 757.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 758.
121. Id. at 759.
122. Id.
123. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
124. The Court in Ashcroft found unconstitutional the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996 that prohibited depictions of child pornography using adult actors. The Court
found that the statute was overly broad and curbed lawful expression of ideas because the
use of adult actors to depict children did not harm children in the making and unlawfully
prohibited adults' rights to free speech.
125. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.
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a state might have a compelling interest in protecting children, the
Court's "decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as
establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of
speech outside the scope of the First Amendment."'126 For example,
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union127 was the first case to deal
with free speech in the realm of the internet.' The Court found that
two sections of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA")
were unconstitutional, even though they were designed to protect
minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech."9 While the
CDA's goal was similar to the statute's goal in Ferber, it was not
narrowly tailored to further the state's compelling interest." The
Court explained that the interest of protecting children "does not
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to
adults ... the Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population...
to... only what is fit for children.""'' . Moreover, the statute was not
the least restrictive means for protecting children from indecent and
patently offensive speech on the internet because there were other
ways to censor indecent speech from children, such as through
parental control features on websites"' Since these alternative means
were not used and the CDA restricted the rights of adults, the statute
was found to be over-inclusive and unconstitutional.
33
Given the strict requirements for carving out a new category of
unprotected speech, courts should apply the Ferber reasoning when
labeling cyber-harassment as a previously unidentified category of
unprotected speech. As mentioned before, cyber-harassment and
revenge pornography have been all too common problems in today's
society. The internet's ubiquitous nature exacerbates the harms of
"harassment" in the digital era. Because the internet is global and
easily accessible, "no longer can [bullied] individuals find refuge in
their homes because they can now be reached at all times of day via
electronic communication.'' 34 The timelessness, lack of boundaries,
126. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
127. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 846.
131. Id. at 875.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Calvert, supra note 12, at 16.
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and constant presence of the internet distinguishes in-person
harassment from cyber-harassment. Cyber-harassment and the
dissemination of revenge pornography have lasting repercussions,
with vicious rumors, photographs and videos being easily traceable
for years to come on the internet.'35 Such permanence may affect the
victims' reputations for many years, impacting their employment
opportunities, social lives, and psychological well-being. In fact, due
to the long-lasting effects and the "serious psychological harm,
including depression, low self-esteem, anxiety, alienation, and suicidal
intentions, states have a strong compelling interest in protecting
women, who are disparately impacted, from cyber-harassment. In
enacting revenge pornography laws, states would not only promote
awareness of the problem, but would emphasize that revenge
pornography is socially and legally unacceptable in society.
Curtailing the use of revenge pornography is also the least restrictive
means for protecting victims. Through the Court's recognition of
revenge pornography as a new category of unprotected speech, only
media that fits the definition of "revenge pornography" would be
prohibited. Consensual pornography would still exist as protected
speech, and those who want to access pornographic materials would
still have the liberty to do so.
III. California's Approach to Revenge Pornography
A. People v. Rosa
The bill analysis of California's "revenge pornography law" cited
Rosa as an example of a situation in which a revenge pornography
law would have been applicable.'37 Plaintiff, Vander Tuig, and
defendant, Rosa, ended their rocky marriage, during which Rosa
threatened to kill Vander Tuig numerous times."' In August 2009,
Vander Tuig received a confusing phone call at the bank where she
worked.39 The voice on the other line explained that he was
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Cal. Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 255 (2013-2014
Reg. Sess.), as amended Aug. 21, 2013.
138. People v. Rosa, No. F063748, 2013 WL 941728 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2013),
review denied (June 19, 2013).
139. Id. at *2.
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responding to Vander Tuig's advertisement from a website.4° Vander
Tuig was unaware of any personal advertisements on any website and
informed the man that he was calling the wrong number.'41 That same
week, Vander Tuig received dozens of phone calls responding to the
advertisement and even had people approach her while at work
regarding the advertisement.42 In fact:
One man yelled at her that she should be ashamed,
teasing men by placing an ad like that on the Internet.
Another man waited at her car for her to get off work
and made rude comments to her. The calls went on
for weeks. [Vander Tuig] had to change jobs and her
residence because of the constant harassment.
43
Vander Tuig eventually learned about the personal
advertisement that callers were referring to and found four of her
nude pictures on the website with the text "call for a good time"
attached to it.'" These pictures were ones that were taken during her
marriage to Rosa, which were not intended for anyone else but Rosa
to view.
45
As a result of the dissemination of her nude pictures, Vander
Tuig lived her life in fear, worried about her children's safety, and
"constantly checked to see if Rosa was following her whenever she
went to the store."'' 46 Vander Tuig's current husband, James, testified
that her demeanor had completely changed as a result of the cyber-
harassment.4 1 James also testified that he saw Vander Tuig's nude
photos on the internet while Tuig was with him. 48 As a result, Vander
Tuig become extremely upset.'9 James further explained that "[t]he




143. Id. at *4.
144. ld.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *5.
147. Id. at *6.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *6.
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The jury found Rosa guilty of "stalking, identity theft, six counts
of false personation, and six counts of unauthorized electronic
distribution of personal information.''.. In discussing Rosa's violation
of identity theft, the court also used libel law to explain that Rosa
"exposed [Vander Tuig] to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy
within the meaning of Civil Code section 45. " 152
Rosa provides us with a preliminary understanding for why
revenge pornography laws are necessary: for a broader rule that
focuses more on the victim rather than on the perpetrator. Emotional
distress is not addressed directly by any of the statutes under which
Rosa was convicted. While existing criminal laws were applicable in
Rosa, not all situations will allow for the easy application of such laws.
For example, if a perpetrator simply posts a picture online without
impersonating the victim or giving out her information, he could
avoid prosecution for false personation and unauthorized electronic
distribution of personal information. In such a situation, there are
fewer avenues of justice available for the victim.
Civil actions through defamation and libel are also inadequate to
remedy victims' pain and suffering. Professor Mary Anne Franks
explains that "civil suits are costly, time-consuming, and extremely
burdensome to victims." '153 Thus, it would be most efficient to address
revenge pornography cases through a broader victim-centered
criminal rule. Rather than applying criminal laws that may or may
not apply in a certain case, or dealing with burdensome and costly
civil litigation, a victim-centered criminal rule would provide a legal
avenue in situations that do not mirror the facts of Rosa.
B. California Legislation
In late fall of 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed the
anti-revenge pornography bill into law.1 4 California is the second
state, after New Jersey, to penalize revenge pornography.' An
impetus behind the bill was the suicide of a Northern California
151. Id.
152. Id. at 30-31.
153. Kaimipono D. Wenger, Legal Developments in Revenge Porn, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:12PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/10/
legal-developments-in-revenge-porn-an-interview-with-mary-anne-franks.html.
154. Electronic communication devices: prohibited distribution of personal
information, S.B. 255, 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013).




teenager, Audrie Pott, who committed suicide in response to the
dissemination of explicit photographs of three boys sexually
assaulting her."' Though Pott's assaulters served some time in
juvenile hall for their crimes of assault, they were not prosecuted for
circulating the photographs. Moreover, "prosecutors did not have
enough evidence to prove the boys circulated the photos widely."'57
The anti-revenge pornography bill sought to redress this gap in justice
and attempted to address the changing nature of assault and
harassment in the age of technology."' The law deems a
misdemeanor
[a]ny person who photographs or records by any
means the image of the intimate body part or parts of
another identifiable person, under circumstances
where the parties agree or understand that the image
shall remain private, and the person subsequently
distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause
serious emotional distress, and the depicted person
suffers serious emotional distress.59
The case of Pott is distinguishable because it involved minors and
was about the assault of a minor while she was passed out and
intoxicated. Though proof of dissemination was an issue, the
assaulters can be punished under criminal law for statutory rape and
the prosecution has a case for cyber-bullying, which is a crime in
California.'6' The anti-revenge pornography law, in its current form,
protects victims of sexual harassment in the form of reputational
harm.' The law focuses on the key word, "consent," and helps
prosecutors make the point that though the photographs may have
been taken with consent at some point, there is an implicit
understanding that the photographs would remain private between
156. Samantha Tata, California Lawmakers Pass "Revenge Porn" Bill, NBC LOS
ANGELES, http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Cyber-Revenge-Porn-California-Law
-Gov-Jerry-Brown-223549611.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
157. Julia Prodis Sulek, Audrie Pott, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.
mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci-24913018/audrie-pott-boys-admit-sexually-assaulting-
saratoga-teen (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
158. Id.
159. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647.
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2.
161. S.B. 255 2013 Leg. (Cal. 2013).
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the involved parties. 2 Of course, the law also penalizes
nonconsensual photographers, such as with Audrie Pott, where one
takes photos of the victim without her consent or under duress.'
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") is one of the
main organizations that opposed the passage of the anti-revenge
pornography bill."6  The ACLU contends that "[t]he posting of
otherwise lawful speech or images even if offensive or emotionally
distressing is constitutionally protected.,16  The ACLU further
contends that speech must be a true threat under the meaning of
constitutional precedent, or must violate "another otherwise lawful
criminal law, such as stalking or harassment statute, in order to be
made illegal." ' 66  Arguing that the anti-revenge pornography law
violates free speech standards, the ACLU urges that California
legislatures reconsider the bill. 67
C. Criticisms of California's Approach
1. The Law Does Not Protect Victims Who Took "Selfies"
Although it is commendable that California is one of the first two
states that have enacted a revenge pornography law, California's law
does not fully afford victims protection against cyber-harassment.
Moreover, the law does not penalize the unauthorized posting of
photos taken by the victims themselves, otherwise known as "selfies."
Though not all cases of revenge pornography are based on photos
taken by the victims themselves, "[a] survey conducted by the Cyber
Civil Rights Initiative, a non-profit that confronts abuse online, found
that eighty percent of photos published in revenge porn cases were
self-taken shots, so the California law would only protect a minority
of victims."1'6 Though the bill may be expanded to include self-shots
by victims in the future, "much of the pushback that came from
California legislators was rooted in 'victim-blaming."" 69  Victim-
162. Id.
163. Id.
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blaming entails a negative view of the victim, and includes beliefs that
the victims are at fault for taking such risqu6 photos, given that
dissemination is a foreseeable risk. However, this "victim-blaming"
approach is erroneous. The victim-blaming approach has led to
oversight of the fact that "[c]onsent is contextual.'"17 Law professor
Danielle Citron elaborated on the fact that victims should not be
viewed as foolish for taking these pictures because they never gave
consent to the broad dissemination of the photos.7' Moreover, Citron
argues that "[c]onsent to sharing with a loved one is not consent to
sharing with the world."'72 Thus, the law should center on the lack of
consent and should include protection for victims who took the
photos themselves, as well as victims who had their photos taken by
someone else. Law Professor Mary Anne Franks, provided a good
analogy that can help us better understand how selfies shared with
others bring up an implicit understanding of limited consent.
According to Franks, "[i]f you give your credit card to a waiter, you
aren't giving him permission to buy a yacht.',73 Similarly, if a woman
shares a nude picture with her significant other, she has not given this
person free reign to distribute the picture and abuse the woman's
autonomy and privacy with regards to the picture. If legislators could
understand this, more victims might be better protected under a more
expansive law including selfies.
2. The Law Shields Perpetrators Who Can Successfully Claim That Their
Intent Was Not to Cause Emotional Distress
An additional criticism of California's revenge pornography law
is regarding its "language stating that in order to run afoul of the law,
the perpetrator must have distributed the image with 'intent to cause
serious emotional distress,"' rather than, as journalist Emily Bazelon
puts it, "treating the act of posting a sexual photo without consent as
an objectively harmful invasion of privacy.'' 74 Though the reasoning
behind the posting of revenge pornography might be to cause the
victim emotional distress, a perpetrator might be able to escape
170. Julia Dahl, "Revenge porn" law in California a good first step, but flawed, experts




173. Anne Flaherty, 'Revenge porn' victims press for new laws, BIG STORY (Nov. 15,
2013, 12:34 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/revenge-porn-victims-press-new-laws.
174. See Dahl, supra note 170.
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liability if he proves that his primary aim was not to cause emotional
distress. For example, a perpetrator who attempts to profit by selling
the pictures of the victim would be protected. Current California
legislation unfairly overlooks the victim's emotional distress and
allows invasion of privacy, especially if the perpetrator's intent
remains unknown. Thus, the revenge pornography law should be
redrafted to exclude the intent of the perpetrator.
3. The Law Does Not Punish Webmasters of Websites for Allowing and
Encouraging the Posting of Revenge Pornography
In the scenario of Jane and John, John's refusal to take down
pictures of Jane was only one part of the problem. The webmaster of
the revenge pornography website also took no steps to remove the
photographs and California's revenge pornography law does not
punish such webmasters. In fact, webmasters of websites often
receive additional protection under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act.75 However, protecting webmasters
under the Communications Decency Act is contrary to the
Legislature's policy "to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking,
and harassment by means of computer.17 6  Furthermore, the
Communications Decency Act provides that an online service
provider (such as a webmaster) is not the publisher of content posted
by third parties." In an effort to promote the development of the
internet, a service provider is only liable for content posted by users if
the service provider has an active role in selecting and editing the
allegedly defamatory material."7
Websites such as IsAnyoneUp.com and Myex.com exist
primarily for the purpose of posting revenge pornography. The
webmasters profit from selling perpetrators the opportunity to post
nude pictures of their victims without the victims' consent and from
the advertisements that third parties pay the webmaster to post on
the website next to the pictures. Additionally, these websites benefit
economically from the emotional distress of victims. The webmasters
often have "reputation protection" services attached to them with a
heavy price for victims to pay in order for them to have their photos
175. 47 U.S.C. § 230.




removed.9 While the promotion of internet and freedom of speech
are important values in the United States, it is troubling to see that
webmasters can go unpunished and can allow for revenge
pornography to be massively disseminated, further impacting victims'
emotional well-being and sense of physical security. In fact,
webmasters that have "reputation protection" services contribute to
the creation and development of information, and thus, would not be
content providers, but content creators under the Communications
Decency Act.
4. The Law Should Require Stricter Remedial Punishment to Increase the
Deterrent Effect
Given the fact that many other states are following in
California's footsteps, the passage of California's revenge
pornography law is a significant first step.8' However, the
punishment provided in the statute is too lehient. A violation of
California's revenge pornography is a misdemeanor and punishable
by up to six months of jail time and up to $1,000 in fines.18" ' The
punishment for revenge pornography in California is less severe than
that under California's cyber-stalking laws, which deems cyber-
stalking a felony punishable by up to one year of jail time and up to
$1,000 in fines.'82 Since the effects of revenge pornography are just as
severe, if not more severe, than cyber stalking, the punishment for the
two crimes should be equal. Thus, California legislators should make
perpetrators of revenge pornography felons subject to punishment of
at least a year in jail and/or $1,000 in fines.
Conclusion
Cyber-harassment in the form of revenge pornography has
become an increasingly prevalent problem in today's internet era.
Women are disproportionately impacted and, as demonstrated in the
example of Jane and John, female victims face life-altering
179. Disgustingly enough, some webmasters of revenge pornography use the
helplessness of victims to further manipulate and humiliate victims-some webmasters
have demanded that victims "[diump $500 into a PayPal account, and maybe they will take
down [the] photo." See Flaherty, supra note 173.
180. Jessica Roy, California's New Anti-Revenge Porn Bill Won't Protect Most Victims,
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consequences, including depression, ruined reputations, and even
threats to their physical safety. The First Amendment provides
constitutional protection for one's freedom of speech; however,
revenge pornography should be deemed an exception. Courts can
categorize revenge pornography as a type of true threat, an example
of fighting words, or a new form of unprotected speech.
Though California's revenge pornography law is a commendable
first step in prohibiting revenge pornography, California still has
room to improve. More specifically, California should revise its law
to: prohibit the posting of selfies by someone other than the
photographer, punish webmasters of revenge pornography websites if
they have any role in profiting from the posting of these pictures, and
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